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To better track public health events in areas where the public health system is unable or unwilling to report the event to
appropriate public health authorities, agencies can conduct event-based surveillance, which is defined as the organized
collection, monitoring, assessment, and interpretation of unstructured information regarding public health events that
may represent an acute risk to public health. The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC’s) Global
Disease Detection Operations Center (GDDOC) was created in 2007 to serve as CDC’s platform dedicated to con-
ducting worldwide event-based surveillance, which is now highlighted as part of the ‘‘detect’’ element of the Global
Health Security Agenda (GHSA). The GHSA works toward making the world more safe and secure from disease threats
through building capacity to better ‘‘Prevent, Detect, and Respond’’ to those threats. The GDDOC monitors approx-
imately 30 to 40 public health events each day. In this article, we describe the top threats to public health monitored
during 2012 to 2016: avian influenza, cholera, Ebola virus disease, and the vector-borne diseases yellow fever, chi-
kungunya virus, and Zika virus, with updates to the previously described threats from Middle East respiratory syndrome-
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Detecting, reporting, and responding to signifi-cant public health events occurring in areas where the
public health system is unable or unwilling to report the
event to appropriate public health authorities is a constant
challenge for those monitoring global disease activity. To
better track public health events in these situations, agencies
can conduct event-based surveillance, which is defined as
the organized collection, monitoring, assessment, and in-
terpretation of unstructured information regarding public
health events that may represent an acute risk to human
health.1 When conducting event-based surveillance, infor-
mation can be collected through formal channels, such
as already-established public health surveillance systems;
in such instances, event-based surveillance can be comple-
mentary to indicator- or case-based surveillance systems that
collect information on individual cases rather than events.
Event-based surveillance can also be conducted through in-
formal channels, such as through monitoring media reports,
blogs, or even social media. Because events reported through
informal channels commonly involve unconfirmed media
reports, they must be verified before any action is taken.
In 2004, the US Congress authorized an appropriation
of funding to establish a global disease detection program
based at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC), and in 2007, the Global Disease Detection Op-
erations Center (GDDOC) was created to serve as CDC’s
platform dedicated to conducting worldwide event-based
surveillance. Surveillance, including event-based surveil-
lance, is now being highlighted as part of the ‘‘detect’’ el-
ement of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA),
launched in 2014, which works toward making the world
more safe and secure from disease threats through building
capacity to better ‘‘Prevent, Detect, and Respond’’ to those
threats. Capacity to ‘‘detect’’ disease threats is built by es-
tablishing and strengthening global networks for real-time
biosurveillance; strengthening rapid, transparent reporting
and laboratory sample sharing; strengthening laboratory
systems; and deploying an effective biosurveillance work-
force.2 Facilitating detection is the Biosurveillance Indica-
tions and Warning Analytic Community (BIWAC), which
is a self-organized, informal biosurveillance information-
sharing group with participants from multiple US govern-
ment agencies. The BIWAC shares data via unsophisticated
web interfaces (eg, password-protected internet interface)
and has focused on interagency collaboration and partner-
ship.3 A key member of the BIWAC is the Armed Forces
Health Surveillance Branch (AFHSB), which also houses
the Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Re-
sponse System (GEIS).4 Pre-dating the GDDOC, GEIS
was created in 1997 to provide a mechanism in the De-
partment of Defense (DoD) to centralize coordination of
surveillance efforts conducted by the DoD, including
outbreak response, epidemiologic training and capacity
building, and the support of research and innovation in
the US military and partner organizations.4 The GDDOC
has a team of 6 staff and a director with professionally
diverse backgrounds, including epidemiology, microbiology,
and human, veterinary, and tropical medicine; it is situated
in dedicated space located in CDC’s Emergency Operations
Center (EOC), with which the GDDOC liaises both during
GDDOC-supported international deployments of CDC
teams and also when the EOC is activated to respond to an
international disease event.
The GDDOC monitors approximately 30 to 40 public
health events each day and most closely watches those
events that could develop into public health emergencies of
international concern to which CDC may be asked to re-
spond bilaterally by the country experiencing the outbreak,
through the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network
(GOARN), or via both routes. Coordinated by the World
Health Organization (WHO), GOARN is an independent
collaboration of institutions and networks ready to respond
to all-hazard threats of international importance.5 Typically,
the GDDOCmonitors outbreaks of infectious disease and, to
a lesser extent, events involving other disease threats, including
disasters, intoxications, and chemical, radiological, or nuclear
events. The GDDOC also monitors outbreaks of unknown
etiology, many of which are later determined to have an in-
fectious cause; outbreaks among animals are also monitored
for known zoonotic diseases and are continually assessed to
determine whether human cases are associated with a partic-
ular outbreak.6 The GDDOC was created to alert CDC
programs as soon as possible for the purpose of responding
rapidly to mitigate the effects of an event, and, by conducting
event-based surveillance, the GDDOC is able to better po-
sition CDC to respond earlier. Through rapid information
gathering, prompt verification, and timely dissemination of
information, the GDDOC ensures that CDC is always pre-
pared to respond. CDC response teams can deploy interna-
tionally within 24 hours of learning about an outbreak.
During large-scale, international outbreaks or other
public health events, the GDDOC may monitor up to 70
public health events, in different countries, attributable to a
single etiology. For example, in November 2016 the
GDDOC actively monitored 65 events, of which 29 were
events describing autochthonously circulating Zika virus
transmission in the Americas.7 When CDC’s EOC is ac-
tivated for such an event, the GDDOC also becomes part
of the incident management system (IMS), a temporary,
formal organization structure that supports a response, is
flexible to meet rapidly changing demands of the response,
and then disbands once the response is over.8 The
GDDOC’s specific role in the incident management system
is to serve as part of an international task force (ITF), to
facilitate the rapid sharing of outbreak-related information
collected during event-based surveillance, which, when
verified, assists in informing evidence-based decisions, in-
cluding those directing how to best position CDC staff,
funding, and other resources.
This report serves as an update to a previously published
article, ‘‘What We Are Watching: Five Top Global In-
fectious Disease Threats, 2012: A Perspective from CDC’s
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Global Disease Detection Operations Center,’’ published
in 2013.6 The 5 top potential threats of 2012 were based on
subjective judgment, with input from CDC subject matter
experts, regarding high transmissibility, disease burden, and
severity; established or pandemic potential; disease eradi-
cation; and lack of available preventive or treatment inter-
ventions. The 5 potential top threats were not selected on
the basis of an analytical algorithm or quantitative method.
They were: avian influenza A (H5N1), cholera, poliomy-
elitis, enterovirus-71, and extensively drug-resistant tuber-
culosis, with addenda of MERS-Coronavirus and avian
influenza A (H7N9), both of which were newly emerging.
The same judgment was used to arrive at the top potential
threats during 2013 to 2016, and the rationale for the se-
lection of each is provided here. These threats have been
attributed to recent or current outbreaks around the world,
and future potential international outbreaks are not limited
to those described in this article. Further, the GDDOC is
continuously monitoring threats that could evolve into
international outbreaks in the near future that would war-
rant placement in future updates to this report.
Top Potential Infectious
Disease Threats
Influenza Viruses
Influenza viruses comprise 4 types: A, B, C, and D. Influ-
enza A viruses are further classified into subtypes on the
basis of the characteristics of the 2 main surface glycopro-
teins, hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA), and
numbered accordingly. While only 2 influenza A virus
subtypes (H3N2 and H1N1pdm09) are circulating among
humans, the natural reservoir for nearly all influenza A
viruses is wild waterfowl. Of the 18 HA and 11 NA in-
fluenza A virus subtypes, all but H17N10 and H18N11
viruses have been identified in birds. Some influenza A
viruses circulate among pigs, and others have been identi-
fied in a wide number of animal species.
Only influenza A viruses cause seasonal influenza epi-
demics and rare pandemics among people. Influenza B
viruses can cause seasonal epidemics, influenza C viruses
typically cause mild respiratory illness and do not cause
epidemics, and influenza D viruses primarily affect cattle
and are not known to cause illness in people.9
Novel influenza A viruses refer to viruses of animal origin
that have infected humans and that are antigenically and
genetically distinct from seasonal influenza A viruses cir-
culating among people. We closely monitor novel influ-
enza A viruses, because influenza A viruses continue to
evolve and because zoonotic transmission could herald an
increasing pandemic influenza health threat. If a novel in-
fluenza A virus acquires the ability for sustained human-to-
human transmission, a pandemic can result. Accordingly,
early detection of pandemic-potential viruses may aid in the
control and possible prevention of the next pandemic. Al-
though a swine-origin influenza A virus caused the 2009
H1N1 pandemic,10,11 and sporadic transmission of swine-
origin influenza A viruses to humans (termed ‘‘variant
viruses’’) continue to be detected in the United States and
in other countries with appropriate laboratory capacity, the
public health threat posed by avian influenza A viruses
appears to be higher because of their diversity and wide
circulation among birds worldwide; the birds’ migratory
flyways may also be conducive to spread of influenza A
viruses. Furthermore, some previous pandemic influenza
A viruses have been partly of avian origin.11
Avian Influenza A Viruses
Avian influenza A viruses circulate widely among bird
populations and can infect domestic poultry and other
animal species, as well as causing sporadic human infec-
tions. Avian influenza A viruses are classified on the basis
of molecular characteristics and pathogenicity criteria as
‘‘highly pathogenic’’ or ‘‘low pathogenic,’’ which generally
refers to the extent of disease in infected poultry. Highly
pathogenic avian influenza A virus infection of poultry can
be rapidly fatal, whereas low-pathogenic avian influenza A
virus infection of poultry may be asymptomatic or cause
only very mild disease. However, sporadic human infec-
tions with either low-pathogenic or highly pathogenic avian
influenza A viruses can result in a wide spectrum of illness,
ranging from mild to severe to fatal disease. The zoonotic
disease potential is attributable to the close relationship
humans share with birds: production (ie, as a food source)
or companionship. Risk factors for human infection with
avian influenza A viruses include direct or close exposure to
infected poultry, including backyard poultry, or working at
or visiting a live poultry market. Although several novel
influenza A viruses have been identified that are circulating
among birds (eg, H5N1, H5N6, H6N1, H7N2, H7N3,
H7N7, H7N9, H9N2, H10N7, H10N8), 2 subtypes of
avian influenza A viruses have caused the highest number
of human infections and are of special concern.
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Virus
Highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus in-
fection of humans was first identified in 1997 in Hong
Kong. The first case was identified in May of that year, and
an additional 17 infections were detected in November
and December 2017.12 Since then, H5N1 virus infections
among humans have been reported in 16 countries, in-
cluding 1 infection in a person who traveled to Beijing,
China, and was diagnosed with pneumonia and meningo-
encephalitis after returning to Canada in late 2013.13 Be-
tween November 2003 and April 2017, a total of 858
infections with 453 deaths in humans attributable to highly
pathogenic avian influenza A (H5N1) virus infection were
reported to WHO.14 Of the 858 infections, 793 (92.4%)
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have been reported from 5 countries: Egypt (358 infec-
tions), Indonesia (199), Vietnam (127), Cambodia (56),
and China (53).14 Of all reported infections, 52.8% (453/
858) have been fatal.15 H5N1 virus infection can cause
rapidly progressive pneumonia and multiple organ failure,
leading to death.16 Risk factors include direct or close ex-
posure to sick or dead infected poultry or visiting a live
poultry market.17,18 Highly pathogenic avian influenza
A (H5N1) virus is of major concern because case clus-
ters representing limited, nonsustained human-to-human
transmission has been reported in multiple countries,19-21
and viral evolution is ongoing in infected poultry.
Low-Pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H7N9) Virus
The first 3 human infections with low-pathogenic avian
influenza A (H7N9) virus were reported in China in March
2013 from Shanghai Special Administrative Region (2 in-
fections) and Anhui Province (1), and all were fatal.22,23 This
was the first time that infection with a low-pathogenic avian
influenza A virus had caused severe and fatal human disease.
Since then, infections in humans with low-pathogenic avian
influenza A (H7N9) virus infection have been reported from
throughout China.24
As of April 2017, there were nearly 1,400 infections in
humans with avian influenza A (H7N9), with at least 530
deaths reported to WHO,25 including those reported from
China’s Special Administrative Region (SAR) of Hong
Kong (21 infections). Of particular concern are those that
were acquired in China and then subsequently exported to
other countries and later diagnosed, allowing potential
autochthonous transmission in those areas, including Tai-
wan SAR (5), Canada (2), Macao SAR (2), and Malaysia
(1).25 Most reported infections with avian influenza A
(H7N9) have been hospitalized with pneumonia, and de-
cedents had multi-organ failure.26
Risk factors for H7N9 virus infection are visiting or
working at a live poultry market and raising backyard
poultry in China.27,28 Prevention measures have included
the temporary closure and decontamination of live poultry
markets.29,30 While studies have shown that the exposure
potential of avian influenza A (H7N9) virus persists in live
poultry markets, closure and decontamination of these
markets may rapidly reduce the occurrence of infections of
avian influenza A (H7N9) virus in poultry, thus preventing
transmission of the virus to humans.31
During the fifth epidemic of this outbreak, which began
October 1, 2016, there was a significant increase in human
infections with avian influenza A (H7N9) compared with
the first 4 epidemics.32,33 The number of provinces with
H7N9 infections has increased, and some human infections
with highly pathogenic avian influenza A (H7N9) virus
have been reported in 2017, suggesting ongoing evolution
of H7N9 viruses in poultry.34 We are constantly moni-
toring disease reports that not only report human illness,
but that also report detection of H7N9 virus in poultry,
including backyard poultry and in live poultry markets.
Cholera
Cholera remains a top potential threat that we continuously
monitor very closely.6 Cholera is an acute gastrointestinal
infection caused by ingestion of food or water containing
the bacterium Vibrio cholerae serogroup O1 or O139.35 V.
cholerae continues to infect, and kill, large numbers of
people very quickly; it spreads easily through crowded
environments with fractured water and sanitation infra-
structure, such as densely populated urban slums and set-
tlements for internally displaced persons. In 2015, 42
countries reported to WHO a total of 172,454 cases with
1,304 deaths attributable to cholera, although an estimated
2.8 million cases and 91,000 deaths are thought to occur
each year.36,37 Of the 172,454 reported cases, 71,176 cases
(41.3%) and 937 deaths (74.6%) were reported from sub-
Saharan Africa;38 none of these cases was imported.
Notably, cases were reported from Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) (19,182 cases), Kenya (13,291), Tanzania
(11,563), Mozambique (8,739), Somalia (7,536), and
Nigeria (5,290). These 6 countries together reported 821
deaths, resulting in a case-fatality proportion of 1.25%; no
cases were reported from northern Africa.38 Cholera con-
tinues to be a threat in sub-Saharan Africa, the region with
the lowest coverage of improved water and sanitation and
a multitude of health system challenges. Epidemic chol-
era creates an additional burden on health facilities and
personnel already stressed by HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuber-
culosis, and other infectious and noninfectious causes of
morbidity and mortality (eg, malnutrition).
Asia reported 64,590 cases with 30 deaths to WHO in
2015, with most cases reported from Afghanistan (58,064;
89.9%) and Iraq (4,965; 7.7%); of the 64,590 cases, 57
were reported to be imported cases, into Iran (36), Bahrain
(8), Japan (7), Kuwait (5), and Oman (1).38
Of increasing concern over the past several years is
the establishment of cholera in the Americas, beginning
with Haiti, which first reported cases in association with an
outbreak in October 2010 that ultimately resulted in
754,972 cases and 8,863 deaths through the end of 2015. A
total of 36,045 cases were reported in 2015 alone, which
represents an increase of 30% in case counts from 2014.
Despite the continued efforts of the Minste`re de la Sante´
Publique et de la Population, cholera has maintained a
presence in the country since the 2010 outbreak. And like
sub-Saharan Africa, with a less than ideal healthcare infra-
structure, the well-proven risk of explosive epidemics in
Haiti and of spread to other nations remains as long as
cholera is present.39
To combat endemic and epidemic cholera, in 2013
WHO created the world’s first oral cholera vaccine (OCV)
stockpile, which continues to expand.40 Since operations
began, a total of 21 oral cholera vaccine deployments of
about 4 million doses to 11 countries have been used in
various contexts: humanitarian crises in Cameroon, Haiti,
Iraq, Nepal, South Sudan, and the United Republic of
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Tanzania; outbreaks in Guinea and Malawi; and in en-
demic areas such as Bangladesh and DRC.41 Also of note,
to prevent international spread of cholera, particularly
among travelers, is the recent licensure and availability
of Vaxchora, a single-dose, live attenuated, oral cholera
vaccine in the United States, the first cholera vaccine to be
licensed in the United States in many decades and the only
one that is available in the United States.42
In 2016, GDDOC closely watched and reported on
widespread and persistent epidemics of cholera in Haiti,
Kenya, Tanzania, DRC, South Sudan, the Central African
Republic, Burundi, Benin, Ethiopia (acute watery diar-
rhea), Djibouti, and Yemen and have responded to requests
for assistance or otherwise provided technical assistance to
Haiti, Kenya, Tanzania, and DRC. We will continue to
monitor reports of cholera, particularly those reports that
could signify exportation into a country with an already-
weakened healthcare system, placing the country at risk for
Vibrio cholerae to become established, as occurred in Haiti.
Ebola Virus Disease
Ebola virus disease (EVD) was first discovered in 1976
when an outbreak of an acute viral hemorrhagic fever oc-
curred in what was formerly northern Zaire, with secondary
and tertiary cases reported in the city of Kinshasa. Signs and
symptoms were nonspecific at clinical onset but progressed
to include others such as sore throat, fever, maculopapular
rash, abdominal pain, and bleeding.43 Ultimately, there
were 318 cases reported in association with this outbreak,
with 280 deaths. Laboratory investigations revealed the
outbreak was caused by a virus similar to Marburg virus
(discovered in 1969), and it was named Ebola virus. Ebola
virus is now a member of the genus Ebolavirus (in the
Filoviridae family), which contains 5 related virus species:
Ebola, Sudan, Reston, Taı¨ Forest, and Bundibugyo ebola-
viruses. Since their discovery, these viruses have been
the cause of more than 30 separate reported outbreaks.44
Fatality rates vary between the viruses and among outbreaks,
however; for example, Reston ebolavirus infection does not
cause disease in humans, only in nonhuman primates.45,46
Outbreaks of EVD had been limited to localized out-
breaks in sub-Saharan Africa or laboratory exposures until
March 2014, when approximately 50 cases (with 10 deaths)
of an unspecified viral hemorrhagic fever were reported
in the forested southeastern prefectures of Macenta and
Gueckedou, Guinea, close to the border with Sierra Leone.
Signs and symptoms associated with these cases included
high fever, diarrhea, vomiting, and bleeding. Specimens
tested at Institut Pasteur’s BSL-4 facility in Lyon, France,
indicated that these cases were attributable to a filovirus,
one of a family of single-stranded negative-sense RNA
viruses that can cause severe hemorrhagic fever in humans
and nonhuman primates.47 On March 22, the outbreak
was confirmed as an Ebola virus (Zaire ebolavirus) associ-
ated outbreak. Cases had increased to a total of 86 cases
with 59 deaths; all cases were epidemiologically linked and
included healthcare workers.48 Later that March, cases began
to be reported from other Guinean prefectures, including
the capital Conakry, and from Liberia in patients who had
traveled to Guinea prior to illness onset; additional cases
began to be reported from Sierra Leone and Nigeria.
In July and August 2014, based on widespread trans-
mission and crossing of international borders, CDC’s EOC
was activated to provide an agency-wide response to the
outbreak, and WHO declared the outbreak a public health
event of international concern (PHEIC), defined as an
extraordinary event determined to constitute a public
health risk to other states parties through the international
spread of disease and to potentially require a coordinated
international response.49 National and international part-
ners put in place a multitude of actions to mitigate the
enlarging outbreak, including activation of national disas-
ter and emergency management mechanisms, support of
clinical and diagnostic facilities, and coordination across
communities, including medical facilities, as well as an-
thropological support to involve the general population,
traditional healers, and religious entities.50
Ultimately, this outbreak in West Africa grew to be the
largest EVD outbreak ever recorded. As of March 2016,
a total of 28,646 suspected, probable, and laboratory-
confirmed cases with 11,323 deaths had been reported
from Guinea (3,811 cases; 2,543 deaths), Liberia (10,675;
4,809), Sierra Leone (14,124; 3,956), Nigeria (20; 8), Mali
(8; 6), and Senegal (1 case), resulting from importation of
cases and minimal sustained transmission. The remainder of
cases were a result of importation or travel: Italy (1 case),
Spain (1), the United Kingdom (1), and the United States
(4 cases; 1 death).51
We monitored this global outbreak very closely because
of the unforeseen explosion of cases and transmission across
international borders. This occurred as a result of weakened
or fractured healthcare infrastructure, continued infection
of healthcare workers, and anthropologic or cultural concerns,
such as families hiding their deceased family members—all
contributing to propagation of the outbreak. The outbreak
was declared over in June 2016; however, we continue to
closely monitor any reports, including media reports, from
West Africa in hopes of quickly identifying any additional
EVD that could be a result of, for example, sexual transmis-
sion from EVD survivors.52,53 (Recent studies have indicated
that Ebola virus can survive in semen for extended periods of
time.54,55) Not limiting ourselves to Ebola virus, we closely
monitor any reports of cases that could appear to be a viral
hemorrhagic fever, so we may provide early warning for a
rapid response to prevent another massive global outbreak.
Vector-Borne Diseases
Three vector-borne viruses have caused large outbreaks of
disease since 2013: yellow fever, chikungunya, and Zika
viruses. While yellow fever virus caused a relatively discrete
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outbreak originating in Angola with exported cases and has
been declared over, chikungunya and Zika virus continue
to spread across the Americas. The GDDOC intensely
monitors vector-borne diseases for their ability to spread
quickly via a competent arthropod vector, most notably
Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus. Further, the GDDOC
was and continues to be part of CDC’s response to the Zika
virus outbreak, serving on the EOC’s international task
force. While the EOC was not activated for the recent
yellow fever outbreak or the continuing spread of chi-
kungunya virus, the GDDOC focused event-based sur-
veillance on these 2 pathogens and also assisted in the
deployment of staff to sub-Saharan Africa for the yellow
fever outbreak.
Yellow Fever
Yellow fever warrants a place on our list of top potential
threats to monitor because of the explosive outbreak that
began in late 2015 in Angola. The outbreak spread to all
provinces in the country and to adjacent DRC in 2016.56
The first travel-related cases of yellow fever disease since
2002 were identified in association with this outbreak, with
travel-associated cases exported to China (11 cases), Kenya
(2 cases), and Mauritania (1 case).57,58
Yellow fever can present as an acute viral hemorrhagic
disease and is fatal in 20% to 50% of severe cases. It is
caused by yellow fever virus, the prototypic virus in the
genus Flavivirus. The virus is transmitted through the bite
of a mosquito and is endemic to sub-Saharan Africa and
tropical areas of South America.59 Large epidemics of yel-
low fever occur when infected people introduce the virus
into heavily populated areas with Ae. aegypti, the urban
vector, leading to autochthonous transmission of the virus
that can quickly lead to outbreaks of great magnitude.
The Angolan Public Health Institute first notified WHO
of 4 cases of a febrile jaundice syndrome with bleeding on
December 30, 2015. Of these patients, 3 had already died,
and the other died on December 31, 2015. All cases were
young men residing in Luanda, Angola, and several of them
reportedly had proof of vaccination against yellow fever
(eg, in possession of a yellow card). Laboratory testing
conducted at the National Institute for Communicable
Diseases of the National Health Laboratory Service,
Johannesburg, South Africa, consisted of testing for filo-
viruses, arenaviruses, and bunyaviruses, as well as for chi-
kungunya and dengue viruses, by using reverse transcription
PCR (RT-PCR); all tests were negative.59 However, a real-
time RT-PCR for yellow fever virus produced positive re-
sults for samples from 3 of the patients. The results were
reported back to the Angolan Public Health Institute on
January 19, 2016, and a subsequent investigation deter-
mined that the cases had not been vaccinated against yellow
fever; they had falsified yellow cards.60
Since that time, a total of 4,347 suspected cases with 377
deaths have been reported to WHO; of these, 884 cases and
121 deaths were laboratory confirmed.61 Since the start of
the outbreak, laboratory-confirmed cases have been re-
ported from 80 districts in 16 of 18 provinces. Autoch-
thonous transmission was reported in 45 districts in 12
provinces.61 The last confirmed case had symptom onset on
June 23, 2016.
In early 2016, the DRC reported many cases of yellow
fever disease in travelers going to and from Angola. By
May 2016, the first autochthonous case associated with
the outbreak in Angola was recognized in the country,
with subsequent local cases identified in several additional
provinces in the west of the country, including the capital of
Kinshasa. A total of 2,987 suspected cases were reported
from all 26 provinces, with 78 cases from 8 provinces
having laboratory confirmation. The last confirmed case
had symptom onset on July 12, 2016.
Additional suspected cases continue to occur, but none
have been confirmed by laboratory testing. The response to
this outbreak continues in both countries, including on-
going vaccination campaigns: by October 25, 2016, ap-
proximately 20 million doses of yellow fever vaccine have
been distributed in reactive, preemptive, and preventive
emergency vaccination campaigns in Angola and 9.4 mil-
lion have been distributed in the DRC.61 The large demand
for vaccine created by these outbreaks led to an unprece-
dented shortage of vaccine and to the approval by the
Strategic Advisory Group of Experts on Immunization at
WHO to use fractional doses of the vaccine, which was
done in Kinshasa to preempt further spread.
In May 2016, WHO held a meeting of the emergency
committee under the International Health Regulations
(2005) concerning yellow fever. Although the committee
did not declare yellow fever a public health emergency of
international concern, they did note that the urban yellow
fever outbreaks in Angola and the DRC were a serious
public health event warranting intensified national action
and enhanced international support.62 With an abundant
competent mosquito vector, large susceptible populations,
and limitations of vaccine supply, yellow fever can potentially
spread quickly throughout a population, including to those
outside of traditional areas known to be endemic, thereby
warranting sustained, focused surveillance by the GDDOC.
Chikungunya
Prior to 2013, chikungunya virus had not been reported
in the Americas. On December 6, 2013, colleagues at the
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control in-
formed the GDDOC of laboratory-confirmed autochtho-
nous cases of chikungunya being reported on St. Martin, a
Caribbean island and overseas collectivity of France.63
Chikungunya virus is an alphavirus spread by Aedes stego-
myia mosquitoes, with humans serving as the primary res-
ervoir during epidemics. The virus can cause fast-moving,
expansive outbreaks—for example, during 2005-06, an
estimated 40% of the population of La Re´union was in-
fected with chikungunya virus;64 in 2006, an estimated
1.38 million people in India were infected;65 and during
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2008-09, Thailand reported more than 49,000 cases of
chikungunya in 50 provinces of that country.66 During the
first year of the outbreak in the Americas, the disease spread
to 43 countries or territories, with more than 1.1 million
suspected cases reported to the Pan American Health Or-
ganization (PAHO) from affected areas. As of early No-
vember 2016, there have been an additional 1.2 million
suspected autochthonous transmission cases reported to
PAHO from January 2015 to November 2016.67
Chikungunya virus causes fever, rash, and most notably
severe arthralgia; it is rarely fatal, but the arthralgia can be
severely debilitating and, in some people, initiate a lifetime
of chronic pain and disability.68 There is neither a specific
treatment for chikungunya nor a vaccine to prevent it; care
is typically supportive.67 The GDDOC continues to con-
duct event-based surveillance for reports of illness poten-
tially attributable to chikungunya virus and informs leaders
of findings. Further, streamlined communications with
CDC’s Division of Vector-Borne Diseases as well as with
PAHO allow for prioritization of resources, including staff
and funding.
Zika Virus
Zika virus was identified in 1947 when it was discovered in
a sentinel rhesus monkey during routine surveillance for
yellow fever in the Zika Forest near Entebbe, Uganda. The
first human cases were identified in 1952 in Uganda and
Tanzania,69 with few reports of human infection in Asia
and Africa over the next several decades.70 However, in
2007 on Yap Island, Micronesia, an outbreak of an un-
known illness among patients with signs and symptoms
including rash, conjunctivitis, and arthralgia was identified
to be attributable to Zika virus; the outbreak resulted in 49
laboratory confirmed and 59 probable cases of Zika virus
and led to more than 70% of the population being infected
with the virus.71 Starting in 2013, outbreaks throughout
the Pacific islands were attributed to Zika virus, resulting in
thousands of suspected and probable infections as well as an
increase in the incidence of Guillain-Barre´ syndrome
(GBS).63 In March 2015, Brazil notified WHO of an un-
known illness among humans with rash, occurring in
northeastern states; tests for chikungunya, measles, rubella,
parvovirus B19, and enterovirus were negative.69 It was not
until the following month that Bahia State Laboratory
tested samples that yielded positive results for Zika virus,
and in May Brazil’s national reference laboratory confirmed
Zika virus in a patient’s blood by RT-PCR, confirming
nationwide circulation of the virus.69 Since that time, Zika
virus has spread across the Americas, and as of September
2016, nearly 50 countries and territories in the Americas
have reported autochthonous, vector-borne transmission of
the virus. A total of 73 countries and territories worldwide
have reported evidence of mosquito-borne Zika virus trans-
mission since 2007, with 71 of those reports since 2015.72
Zika virus is in the genus Flavivirus and, like dengue and
chikungunya, is transmitted primarily by Aedes stegomyia
species mosquitoes, notably Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus.
Both mosquito species are present in the United States,
with Ae. albopictus having a much wider range.73 However,
unlike chikungunya or dengue viruses, Zika virus has been
documented to be spread through sexual transmission,
complicating the transmission dynamics of this virus. Zika
virus infections are often asymptomatic or produce a mild
rash illness among healthy adults and children infected after
birth. However, in addition to its association with GBS,
Zika virus infections in pregnancy now have been associ-
ated with congenital infection typically resulting in mi-
crocephaly and other nervous system defects.74 It is the
association with the neurologic diseases, both microcephaly
and GBS, that prompted WHO to declare the neurologic
diseases and their potential association with Zika virus a
public health event of international concern,75 and which
has caused Zika virus to be one of the GDDOC’s top
potential global threats that we are monitoring.
With the uncontrolled transmission of the virus by
wide-ranging Aedes mosquitoes and limited ability to
control these populations, the threat of an increasingly
large epidemic of microcephaly throughout the Americas
and other regions is very real. The effect of microcephaly
on newborns is devastating, potentially resulting in life-
long developmental challenges for these infants,74 which
will create not only healthcare and emotional challenges
for families, but also place an inordinate burden on
healthcare systems and public health infrastructure at-
tempting to provide long-term care for these children. We
will continue to monitor Zika virus epidemiology and
relay additional information about its spread, pathogen-
esis, and clinical outcomes as our knowledge about this
virus continues to evolve.
Updates
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome-Coronavirus
(MERS-CoV)
As of mid-December 2016, a total of 1,864 cases of MERS-
CoV with at least 659 deaths had been reported to WHO
from the Middle Eastern and northern African countries of
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Jordan,
Oman, Iran, Tunisia, Kuwait, Algeria, Yemen, and Leba-
non; exported cases were also reported in the United
Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, Ger-
many, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea.76 Of
note in the Republic of Korea, an exported case of MERS-
CoV in an emergency department patient with a history of
travel to Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar resulted in
an outbreak of 186 cases of MERS-CoV with 36 deaths.
Although the index exposure occurred in a large, crowded
emergency facility, the affected hospital and the health
ministry were quickly able to mitigate the outbreak.77 This
event in South Korea demonstrates how quickly MERS-
CoV can be transmitted from person to person in a tertiary
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care hospital in a developed health infrastructure, further
underscoring the necessity to monitor cases of MERS-CoV.
Poliomyelitis
By the end of 2012, 223 confirmed cases of wild polio-
myelitis (WPV) were reported from countries with en-
demically circulating wild poliovirus: Afghanistan (37),
Pakistan (58), and Nigeria (122), and 5 cases were reported
from Chad. Since then, cases of wild poliomyelitis
have declined, after a peak in 2013 (416 cases), trending
downward through 2014 (359 cases), 2015 (74 cases), and,
as of April 19, 2017, 5 cases of wild poliomyelitis had been
reported to WHO, compared with 11 cases at the same
time in 2016. As of April 19, 2017, no cases of circulating
vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV) had been reported to
WHO compared with 3 cases at the same time in 2016.78
Nigeria, which had been polio-free during 2015 and was
removed from WHO’s polio-endemic list in September of
that year,79 unfortunately reported cases during 2016,
placing it back on the endemic list.80 Monitoring polio
will continue to be important because of the debilitating
neurologic disease poliovirus causes, but it will also be
paramount in the post-eradication era, as even 1 case will
represent an international public health emergency.
Summary
This report describes top potential global infectious dis-
ease threats that the GDDOC was monitoring during
2013-2016, and does not necessarily describe those public
health events that CDC finds most important or events
that require the most resources. With the unique platform
from which event-based surveillance is conducted, the
GDDOC is in a unique position to rapidly identify new
threats to public health, including those that could lead to
a pandemic.
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